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When God Spikes Your Drink:
Guilty Without Mens Rea
Fredrick E. Vars*
INTRODUCTION
Two men walk into a bar. An hour later, one man shoots dead the other.
The charge is first-degree murder, which requires a specific intent to kill. The
shooter was unable to form that intent. In many states, if the source of
incapacity was intoxication, then he will be acquitted. But if the two men were
drinking water, the shooter had schizophrenia, and the source of incapacity was
a paranoid delusion, then the lack of intent is no defense. This is a bad joke.
In Metrish v. Lancaster, the United States Supreme Court unanimously
reaffirmed this absurd proposition.' Burt Lancaster was convicted on retrial in a
Michigan court of first-degree murder.2 Despite a "long history of severe
mental-health problems,"3 Lancaster was not allowed to introduce that
evidence to negate mens rea at his retrial.4 After the crime but before the
retrial, the Michigan Supreme Court had rejected the so-called "diminished
capacity" defense, which had allowed legally sane defendants to present
evidence of mental illness to negate the specific intent required to commit a
Copyright © 2013 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of their
publications.
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particular crime. In May 2013, the United States Supreme Court unanimously
reversed a Sixth Circuit decision granting federal habeas relief to Lancaster,
reasoning that the "diminished capacity" defense could be eliminated
retroactively because doing so was foreseeable and defensible.6 The Court was
wrong on both counts.
Lancaster compounds a fundamental error: In several states (including
Michigan), mental illness evidence on mens rea is excluded, whereas evidence
of intoxication is sometimes allowed.7 Had Lancaster been unknowingly
drugged instead of being mentally ill, he might well have been acquitted of
first-degree murder. Evidence of an inability to formulate the requisite intent to
commit a crime should be equally relevant whatever the source of the
impairment, at least when the impairment is involuntary.
This Essay has three parts. In the first, I show that Lancaster was wrong
on its own terms. The Michigan Supreme Court's elimination of the diminished
capacity defense was not foreseeable and not defensible, so it was
unconstitutional to apply that rule retroactively. Part II argues that mental
illness should be treated at least on the same terms as intoxication. None of the
rationales adopted for channeling mental illness evidence into the insanity
defense distinguishes intoxication. The final part considers whether mental
illness is more analogous to involuntary intoxication or merely voluntary
intoxication. This matters because many jurisdictions consider involuntary
intoxication more favorably. I conclude that usually, but not always, incapacity
due to mental illness is involuntary-it is as if God spiked your drink.
I.
LANCASTER WAS WRONGLY DECIDED
To obtain habeas, Lancaster had to establish that he Michigan court in
applying its new rule retroactively "unreasonably applied federal law clearly
established in [the Court's] decisions."8 In Bouie v. City of Columbia, the Court
held that a criminal defendant could not be convicted for actions that became
criminal only by unreasonable judicial interpretation after the alleged crime.9
Unreasonable here means "unexpected and indefensible."10 In Lancaster,
retroactive elimination of the diminished capacity defense was both unexpected
and indefensible.
The Lancaster Court attempted to distinguish Bouie on the ground that the
Michigan Supreme Court had not previously addressed directly the question of
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1792.
7. The other states include at least Arizona, Indiana, Louisiana, Minnesota, and Virginia. See
infra notes 18 22 and accompanying text; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 22, Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006) (No. 05-5966), 2006 WL 542415, at *22
n. 13.
8. Lancaster, 133 S. Ct. at 1786.
9. 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
10. Lancaster, 133 S. Ct. at 1792 (quoting Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 462 (2001)).
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whether the diminished capacity defense was valid and that the Michigan
Supreme Court overturned lower court decisions based on a reasonable
interpretation of the insanity defense statute." In other words, barring mental
illness evidence was not an "unreasonable" judicial interpretation because it
could have been anticipated and was defensible.
However, neither predicate is valid. Just two years before reversing
course, the Michigan Supreme Court held in a per curiam opinion that it was
"entirely reasonable" for a defense attorney to pursue a diminished capacity
defense and suggested that such a defense could have worked.12 Lower
Michigan courts had overwhelmingly recognized the defense. 13 The decision
jettisoning the defense was unexpected.
More fundamentally, the Michigan Supreme Court's elimination of the
diminished capacity defense was not based on a reasonable reading of the
relevant statute-it was "indefensible." The court concluded that the
diminished capacity defense was inconsistent with the statutory insanity
defense scheme. 14 But the plain language of the statute belies this conclusion.
After outlining the definition of legal insanity, the key section concludes:
"Mental illness or being mentally retarded does not otherwise constitute a
defense of legal insanity."'5 Contrary to clear rules of statutory construction, 16
the Michigan Supreme Court's reading pretends that the last three words of this
sentence do not exist. The legislature expressly defined exclusivity and left
open the possibility that other defenses, like diminished capacity, might rest on
mental conditions. 17 If the legislature actually wanted to eliminate the
diminished capacity defense, it could have done so simply by omitting the
words "of legal insanity." That would have expressly channeled all mental
illness evidence into the insanity defense.
The Michigan Supreme Court's elimination of the diminished capacity
defense was both unexpected and indefensible, and thus it could not be applied
retroactively under Bouie. The unfairness to a defendant like Lancaster is
palpable. Moreover, disallowing mental illness evidence on the issue of intent
is indefensible because, in many jurisdictions, it penalizes the sick but not the
drunk.
11. Id.
12. People v. Lloyd, 590 N.W.2d 738, 745 (1999) (per curiam).
13. Lancaster v. Metrish, 683 F.3d 740, 745-46 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing eleven Michigan Court
of Appeals cases).
14. People v. Carpenter, 627 N.W.2d 276 (Mich. 2001).
15. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.21a(1) (2013) (emphasis added).
16. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 644 N.W.2d 715, 717 (Mich
2002) ("Courts must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute and avoid an
interpretation that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory.").




MENTAL ILLNESS Is ANALOGOUS TO INTOXICATION
Prohibiting mental illness evidence on mens rea is indefensible for
another reason: Intoxication evidence on mens rea is often allowed. Several
states mandate acquittal for involuntary intoxication negating specific intent,
with the ultimate burden of proof on the state beyond a reasonable doubt.'8
Michigan folds involuntary intoxication into insanity. 19 Voluntary intoxication
is not a defense in Michigan unless the defendant "voluntarily" ingested a
substance not knowing it would cause intoxication.20 Truly voluntary
intoxication was a defense in Michigan before 2002,21 and remains a defense in
other states.22 It is absurd to acquit someone who voluntarily got drunk while
convicting an individual in the same mental state due to an illness outside her
control.23
The Michigan Supreme Court in its opinion eliminating the diminished
capacity defense expressly declined to discuss intoxication. It relied instead
entirely on its misreading of the insanity defense statute. The United States
Supreme Court in Lancaster similarly sidestepped the intoxication analogy and,
indeed, any justification for barring mental illness evidence on the issue of
intent.25 The Court had already upheld the bar on mental illness evidence in
26Clark v. Arizona, which Lancaster did not challenge.
Clark subdivided mental illness evidence into two relevant categories:
mental-disease evidence and capacity evidence. 27 "The defendant suffers from
schizophrenia, one symptom of which is delusions," would be mental-disease
evidence. "The defendant lacked the ability to form an intent to kill," would be
capacity evidence. Clark identified three reasons for barring evidence of both
mental-disease and capacity on mens rea: (1) "the controversial character of
some categories of mental disease"; (2) "the potential of mental-disease
evidence to mislead"; and (3) "the danger of according greater certainty to
18. E.g., State v. Edmisten, 207 P.3d 770, 774 (Ariz. App. 2009); State v. Davis, 637 So. 2d
1012 (La. 1994). Indiana puts the burden on the defendant. IND. CODE § 35-41 3 5 (2013); Melendez
v. State, 511 N.E.2d 454, 457 58 (Ind. 1987).
19. People v. Wilkins, 459 N.W.2d 57 (Mich. App. 1990).
20. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.37.
21. People v. Lakeman, 353 N.W.2d 493, 495 (Mich App. 1984).
22. See, e.g., Weaver v. State, 627 N.E.2d 1311 (Ind. App. 1994), aff'd in part, vacated in
part, 643 N.E.2d 342 (Ind. 1994); State v. Kjeldahl, 278 N.W.2d 58, 61 (Minn. 1979); Giarratano v.
Commonwealth, 266 S.E.2d 94, 99 (Va. 1980).
23. E.g., People v. Carpenter 627 N.W.2d 276, 292 n.23 (Mich. 2001) (Kelly, J., dissenting)
("Given that this Court recognizes evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate specific intent, the
majority's rejection of mental abnormality evidence, used for the very same purpose, defies
explanation."); State v. Simmons, 309 S.E.2d 89, 98 (W.V. 1983). See also Lucy Iunan, Mental
Impairment and Mens Rea: North Carolina Recognizes the Diminished Capacity Defense in State v.
Shank and State v. Rose, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1293 (1989).
24. Carpenter, 627 N.W.2d at 284 n. 10.
25. 133 S. Ct. at 1787 n.3.
26. 548 U.S. 735 (2006).
27. Id. at 758 59.
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capacity evidence than experts claim for it.",
2
Although commentators have convincingly rebutted these justifications,
2 9
this Essay makes the narrower argument that mental illness should be
considered on terms at least equal to intoxication. Intoxication and mental
illness are analogous on Clark's very reasons for exclusion: Evidence of
intoxication can be subdivided in the same way (e.g., "defendant was drunk"
and "defendant lacked capacity"); (1) diagnosing intoxication may be even
more difficult than mental illness; (2) intoxication evidence has the same
potential to mislead; and (3) the testimony of intoxication experts may similarly
receive undue weight.
Diagnosing intoxication may seem straightforward, but frequently it is
not. Because intoxication is generally temporary, diagnoses are usually made
retrospectively. Blood, urine, or hair samples may be unavailable, leaving self-
reported drinking or drug use as the only useful data.30 This can generate at
least as much uncertainty as imprecision or controversy in mental illness
categories. There are of course exceptions, but psychiatric diagnosis on the
whole can be quite accurate.31 Even more complex forensic examinations have
been shown to be acceptably reliable and valid. 32
Further, intoxication evidence can mislead. With the exception of drunk
driving, where the crime is defined by reference to blood alcohol concentration
(BAC), there is an imperfect fit between being drunk and being unable to
formulate the required intent. One recent review concluded that essentially
"[n]o behavioral or physical sign has emerged that is consistently related to a
specific level of BAC without large variation among individuals. " 33 In other
words, impaired function is not well correlated with blood alcohol
concentration. And the functions measured in the reviewed studies were
specifically chosen to correlate with blood alcohol level, unlike legal concepts
such as intent. 34
An expert opinion about incapacity has the same risk of being given too
much weight no matter the source of the incapacity. Clark correctly observed
28. Id. at 774.
29. Eg., Dora Klein, Rehabilitating Mental Disorder Evidence After Clark v. Arizona: Of
Burdens, Presumptions, and the Right To Raise Reasonable Doubt, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 645
(2010); Stephen J. Morse, The Uneasy Entente Between Legal Insanity and Mens Rea: Beyond Clark
v. Arizona, 97 J. CRAM. L. & CRVINOLOGY 1071 (2007); Christopher Slobogin The Supreme Court's
Recent Criminal Mental Health Cases, 22 CRIM. JUSTICE 8 (2007).
30. Cf State v. Schael, 388 N.W.2d 641, 643 (Wis. App. 1986).
31. E.g., Darrel A. Regier et al., DSM-5 Field Trials in the United States and Canada, Part II:
Test-Retest Reliability of Selected Categorical Diagnoses, 170 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 59, 63 tbl.2 (2013)
(reporting "good" reliability for diagnoses of schizophrenia and schizoaffective and bipolar I
disorders); Philip D. Harvey et al., Diagnosis of Schizophrenia: Consistency Across Information
Sources and Stability of the Condition, 140 SCHIZOPHRENIA RESEARCH 9, 11 (2012).
32. See John V. Jacobi, Fakers, Nuts, and Federalism: Common Law in the Shadow of the
ADA, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 95, 123 (1999).




that state of mind at the key moment can be elusive and that the law's
categories, like intent, do not match the language of psychology.3 5 Both
observations hold equally for intoxication and mental illness. In the
intoxication context, courts recognize that expert testimony on capacity to form
intent may lack certainty and therefore exclude it on a case-by-case basis. In
State v. Schael, for example, the defendant's expert testified: "I do not feel that
I can give you an answer consistent with reasonable medical certainty as to his
ability to form intent.",3 6 The appellate court affirmed the trial court's exclusion
of the testimony on grounds that it was not probative.
3 7
In sum, none of the justifications given for excluding mental illness
evidence on mens rea supports treating intoxication evidence more favorably.
III.
IS INCAPACITY DUE TO MENTAL ILLNESS VOLUNTARY OR INVOLUNTARY?
The previous section argued that mental illness and intoxication are
analogous, but there are actually two different intoxication defenses: voluntary
and involuntary. Most jurisdictions consider involuntary intoxication more
favorably.38 If you punch someone because someone else spiked your drink,
you are generally not criminally liable. If you spike your own drink, then you
may be liable for what flows from your decision to spike and drink it. Most
commentators assume that mental illness is like involuntary intoxication.
39
People don't choose to be mentally ill: rather, God spikes their drink. This
section examines whether mental illness should be treated more like voluntary
or involuntary intoxication.
Individuals suffering from a first psychotic episode not precipitated
through an external intoxicant would seem to be entirely blameless. This holds
true for second and later episodes as well if the individual was diligently
pursuing reasonable treatment or was unable to obtain treatment. For those
individuals, involuntary intoxication is a near perfect analogy: They lost
capacity through no fault of their own.
But suppose the episode was triggered by voluntary ingestion of an
intoxicant. If a person without mental illness would have suffered the same loss
of capacity, then this is simple voluntary intoxication. If, however, the mental
illness was also a but-for cause, the case is more difficult. Mental illness could
cause the loss of capacity in at least two different ways. First, a mentally ill
individual might decide to have a drink for normal social or other reasons
35. See 548 U.S. at 776 778.
36. 388 N.W.2d 641, 644 (Wis. App. 1986).
37. Id.
38. Tim Feulner, Note, The Minotaur Defense: The Myth of the Pathological Intoxication
Defense, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1969, 1985 & n.145 (2012).
39. Eg., Klein, supra note 29; Stephen P. Garvey, Self Defense and the Mistaken Racist, 11
NEW CRI. L. REv. 119 (2008); see also State v. Provost, 490 N.W.2d 93, 99 (Minn. 1992); State v.
Burge, 487 A.2d 532, 539-40 (Conn. 1985).
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totally unrelated to her illness. If incapacity resulted, the question of
voluntariness should turn on whether incapacity was foreseeable. Some courts
allow the involuntary intoxication defense if the defendant "did not know or
have reason to anticipate the drug's intoxicating effects.",40 Other courts,
however, are skeptical of the analogy: "[M]ental illness caused by voluntary
intoxication is not a defense.'
The second causal story is that the mental illness itself caused the person
to drink or use drugs. Self-medication with drugs and alcohol is a common
phenomenon.42 Since the choice to use the intoxicant was tainted by the illness,
the resulting intoxication is arguably involuntary. But courts generally agree
that alcoholics cannot use their compulsion to drink to argue that intoxication
for them was involuntary. 43 Substance abuse disorder is recognized by many as
a mental illness, so this case law would seem to control. However, some judges
would allow the involuntary intoxication defense for alcoholics,4 4 and
alcoholics "may fairly be held responsible to a substantial degree for becoming
addicted,,45 whereas most mentally ill individuals bear no responsibility for
their condition.
There is a final, closely related scenario: the loss of capacity foreseeably
results from a mentally ill person failing to adhere to prescribed treatment.
While on the surface this appears voluntary, treatment refusal may itself be the
product of mental illness, not free will. For some people this is almost certainly
true: One study found that a majority of patients with schizophrenia did not
believe they were ill. 46 This lack of self-awareness is so common that it has its
own medical term: anosognosia.47 Clearly, this condition would undermine the
"voluntariness" of refusing treatment. At least one court has suggested that a
failure to take medication could be deemed "involuntary." 48 Lack of treatment
compliance may be voluntary or involuntary depending on the facts.
Mental illness evidence should be admissible to negate mens rea. At a
minimum, it should be admissible on the same terms as evidence of
intoxication. Specifically, the inability to formulate intent caused by mental
40. See People v. Mathson 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 167, 180 (Ct. App. 2012).
41. State v. Martin 591 N.W.2d 481, 486 (Minn. 1999); see also People v. Gutierrez, 225 Cal.
Rptr. 885 (Ct. App. 1986); State v. Walker, 235 P.3d 766, 771 (Utah App. 2010).
42. See generally Edward J. Khantzian, The Self Medication Hypothesis of Substance Use
Disorders: A Reconsideration and Recent Applications, 4 HARv. REV. PSYCHIATRY 231 (1997).
43. E.g., State v. Johnson 327 N.W.2d 580 (Minn. 1982); Commonwealthv. Kuhn 475 A.2d
103 (Pa. Super. 1984).
44. Kuhn, 475 A.2dat 113 (Spaeth,J., dissenting).
45. Stephen J. Morse, Addiction, Genetics, and Criminal Responsibility, 69 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB S. 165, 207 (2006).
46. Jane Mulaik, Noncompliance with Medication Regimens in Severely and Persistently
Mentally Ill Schizophrenic Patients , 13 ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 219 (1992).
47. See THE AM. HERITAGE STEDMAN'S MED. DICTIONARY (2002) (defining term as "[rneal
or feigned ignorance of the presence of disease, especially of paralysis").
48. See Holmes v. United States, 615 A.2d 555, 559 n.7 (D.C. 1992); see also Patterson v.
Cockrell, 2003 WL 21355999, at *10 (5th Cir. May 23, 2003).
20131
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illness and by no fault of the defendant should negate mens rea in any case
where the same inability due to involuntary intoxication would do so. Whether
it was God or Larry who spiked your drink should not matter. Where the
mentally ill defendant voluntarily used a known intoxicant, any resulting loss of
capacity should be considered involuntary only to the extent it was
unforeseeable. Evidence regarding both the intoxicant and the mental illness
would be relevant to deciding this question. Finally, the government should
have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant's use of
an intoxicant or failure to adhere to prescribed treatment was knowing and
voluntary should it seek to analogize to voluntary rather than involuntary
intoxication.
CONCLUSION
Prisons have become the new asylums for many reasons. 4 One factor is
bad law made worse by the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in
Metrish v. Lancaster, where the defendant was prevented from introducing
evidence of his mental health to negate intent.50 At the time of the alleged
offense, this "diminished capacity" defense was well-recognized by Michigan
law.5 i The Michigan Supreme Court subsequently eliminated the defense, and
the United States Supreme Court upheld retroactive application of the new rule
to Lancaster. 52
Excluding mental health evidence on intent, even prospectively, is
indefensible. The new rule barring such evidence did not really eliminate a
"defense"-it effectively created a new set of crimes for the mentally ill that do
not require a finding of intent. The unfairness, and indeed illogic, of this new
rule is reinforced by the comparison with intoxication, which is still allowed to
negate mens rea in Michigan. Michigan punishes mental illness even while it
excuses drunkenness. This is not to say that mental illness should always be an
excuse; only that it should be allowed to negate intent on the same terms as
other impairments.
49. See Gary Field & Erica E. Phillips, The New Asylums: Jails Swell With Mentally Ill,
WALL STREET J., Sept. 25, 2013, at Al.
50. Metrishv. Lancaster, 133 S. Ct. 1781, 1785 (2013).
51. See supra note 13.
52. Lancaster, 133 S. Ct. at 1792.
[Vol. 04:209
